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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2330 
___________ 
 
MANUEL DE JESUS MELENDEZ HERNANDEZ,  
a/k/a Manuel De Jesus Melendez-Hernandez,  
a/k/a Manuel De Jesus Melendez,  
a/k/a Manuel D. Melendez, a/k/a Manuel De Jesus Hernandez,  
a/k/a Manuel De Jesus Herna, a/k/a Rodrigo Alvarez, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A078-046-922) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 27, 2017 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 2, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Manuel de Jesus Melendez Hernandez (Melendez), a native and citizen of El 
Salvador who is proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (BIA) final order of removal.  For the following reasons, we will grant the 
petition for review in part, deny it in part, and remand to the BIA.   
 Melendez arrived in the United States in 1999.  In 2001, he was ordered removed 
from the United States because he failed to appear in Immigration Court.  Later, 
Melendez pleaded guilty to giving false information.  He came to the attention of 
immigration authorities after he was arrested for violating the terms of his probation.  In 
2006, Melendez was removed from the United States.  He returned to the United States 
most recently in 2015.  In 2016, Melendez was arrested for possession of marijuana and 
providing false information.  The Government reinstated Melendez’s prior removal order 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).  He sought withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1  See 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1241.8(e), 1208.31(e) (providing that an alien whose prior order of removal has been 
reinstated may seek withholding of removal based on a reasonable fear of persecution or 
torture).  In his application, Melendez alleged that he would be physically harmed or 
killed if removed to El Salvador because he formerly was a member of the MS-13 gang 
                                              
1 Melendez did not assert that he is eligible for asylum.  In any event, we recently held 
that aliens, like Melendez, subject to reinstated removal orders, are ineligible to apply for 
asylum.  Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2017).   
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and because the gang believes that he cooperated with the FBI.   
 An Immigration Judge denied relief and Melendez appealed.  The BIA dismissed 
the appeal.  With respect to withholding under § 1231(b)(3), the Board concluded that 
“former gang members” was not a cognizable social group and that, even if it was, 
Melendez failed to establish that his membership in that group was a central reason for 
the harm alleged.2  As to CAT protection, the BIA stated, inter alia, that Melendez’s fear 
“that he could be tortured by MS-13 gang members and, in turn, a public official would 
consent, acquiesce, or be willfully blind to such harm” was “based upon a speculative 
chain of events.”  Melendez filed a timely petition for review.3   
 For withholding of removal to a particular country, an applicant must establish by 
a “clear probability” that his “life or freedom would be threatened” in the proposed 
country of removal “because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”  § 1231(b)(3); see also Tarrawally v. 
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003).  When, as here, the withholding application 
                                              
2 The Board faulted Melendez for not identifying a protected ground that would serve as 
the basis for his claims.  We disagree with this assessment.  Melendez’s application 
explained that he “no longer wanted to be in a gang” and that gang members “will order 
[his] murder” because they “believe that [he] is a snitch.”  (Administrative Record (A.R.) 
170). 
   
3 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  See Dinnall v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 
247, 251 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005) (exercising jurisdiction over petition for review of 
reinstatement order “[b]ecause an order reinstating a prior removal order is ‘the 
functional equivalent of a final order of removal’”) (quoting Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 
F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2003)).  
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is based on membership in a particular social group, “an applicant must establish both 
that the group itself is properly cognizable as a ‘social group’ within the meaning of the 
statute, and that his membership in the group is ‘one central reason’ why he was or will 
be targeted for persecution.”  Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684-85 (3d 
Cir. 2015).   
 The BIA has explained that a “particular social group” must be “(1) composed of 
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, 
and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”  In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
227, 237 (BIA 2014).  In explaining these requirements, the Board stated that “[s]ocial 
group determinations are made on a case-by-case basis[,]” id. at 251, noted the “fact-
specific context of an applicant’s claim for relief[,]” id. at 241, and cautioned against “a 
blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving gangs.”  Id. at 251.  Here, however, the 
Board concluded that former gang membership was not a cognizable particular social 
group.  But the Board did not discuss the three particular social group elements outlined 
in M-E-V-G- or offer any substantive analysis in support of its conclusion.  See Filja v. 
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[t]he BIA is not required to write an 
exegesis on every contention.  What is required is merely that it consider the issues 
raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to 
perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.”).  Notably, and 
troublingly, in defining Melendez’s putative social group, the Board did not consider 
whether Melendez’s perceived cooperation with law enforcement affected his claim.  See 
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Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 504 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that the petitioner, 
who had testified against gang members, was a member of a particular social group, as 
she had “the shared past experience of assisting law enforcement against violent gangs 
that threaten communities in Guatemala” and that experience constituted “a characteristic 
that members cannot change because it is based on past conduct that cannot be undone.”).  
Because it is not our role to examine the attributes of Melendez’s putative social group in 
the first instance, we will remand to the BIA for further explanation.4  See Serrano-
Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 212 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (observing that “[w]hether a 
social group constitutes a PSG, and is thus cognizable under the … INA[,] … is a 
continuously developing question of law and one that must be answered on a case-by-
case basis.”). 
 The Board also stated that Melendez failed to establish that a “cognizable 
                                              
4 We note that the IJ did “find[] that there is no evidence in the record of El Salvadoran 
society viewing ‘former gang members’ as meaningfully distinguished from the rest of El 
Salvadoran society.”  (A.R. 38).  Specifically, the IJ stated that “[e]ven if [Melendez’s 
social group] were distinct from the perspective of the purposed persecutors here, … 
there is no evidence to suggest that the group is viewed as meaningful[ly] distinct by 
society in general.”  (A.R. 38-39).  But these conclusions were not specifically adopted 
by the BIA, which simply stated – in a conclusory fashion – that there was no cognizable 
social group in play.  See Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003) (“only 
if the BIA expressly adopts or defers to a finding of the IJ, will we review the decision of 
the IJ.”).  In any event, the IJ did not grapple with Melendez’s alleged cooperation with 
the FBI either.  Furthermore, we have not yet determined whether the BIA’s 
interpretation of the term “particular social group” in M-E-V-G- (and in particular its 
conclusion that “a group’s recognition for asylum purposes is determined by the 
perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of the persecutor”) is 
entitled to Chevron deference.  
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protected ground is a central reason for the claimed persecution.”  (A.R. 2).  “For a 
protected characteristic to qualify as ‘one central reason,’ it must be an essential or 
principal reason for the persecution; withholding of removal may not be granted when the 
characteristic at issue ‘played only an incidental, tangential, or superficial role in 
persecution.’”  Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 685 (quoting Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 
557 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Here, Melendez alleged that he will be targeted 
because of his former membership in the MS-13 gang and because the gang believes that 
he cooperated with the FBI.  For instance, he testified that he joined the gang when he 
was 18 years old and that, upon his return to El Salvador in 2006, he was recognized as a 
former gang member because of his tattoos. (A.R. 80, 83).  MS-13 members forced him 
to rejoin the gang under threat of death.  (A.R. 83).  In 2014, Melendez “decided that [he] 
didn’t want to be with [the gang] anymore” and was shot in the leg by MS-13 members 
because he failed to attend a meeting.  (A.R. 85).  He returned to the United States in 
2015, but the gang has continued to look for him in El Salvador.  (A.R. 85-86).  While in 
immigration custody, FBI agents approached Melendez seeking information about the 
location of another gang member.  (A.R. 86-87).  Another detainee discovered that 
Melendez had spoken with the FBI, and reported Melendez to other MS-13 gang 
members.  (A.R. 87-88).  Under these circumstances, we conclude that substantial 
evidence does not support the Board’s conclusion that Melendez’s gang ties were not “at 
least one central reason” for the harms he fears.  See Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 60 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (“the BIA drew too fine a distinction between Oliva’s status as a former 
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member of MS-13 and the threats to kill him for breaking the rules imposed on former 
members.”).  
 We discern no error, however, in the BIA’s disposition of Melendez’s claim for 
relief under the CAT.  Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Melendez did 
not meet his burden of establishing that he is likely to be tortured “by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of” an El Salvadorian public official.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(2); § 1208.18(a)(7); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174–75 (3d Cir. 
2002).  In support of the CAT claim, Melendez asserted that word of his alleged 
cooperation with the FBI will make its way to current MS-13 members in El Salvador, 
that those current members will recognize Melendez when he returns, and that public 
officials will torture him or will acquiesce in torture inflicted on him by the gang 
members.  Although the record contains evidence of government corruption, police 
brutality, and gang violence, as well as Melendez’s prior run-ins with the gang and the 
police, we agree that Melendez failed to establish that each link in that hypothetical chain 
of events is more likely than not to occur.  See In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 & 
n.4 (A.G. 2006).  In particular, Melendez only speculates that officials will torture him or 
will be willfully blind to his torture by MS-13 gang members.  See Denis v. Att’y Gen., 
633 F.3d 201, 218 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that alien’s “unsupported speculation” about 
what he believed would happen to him if removed “does not rise to the level of proof 
necessary to demonstrate that he will more likely than not be singled out for torture.”).  
Accordingly, we are not compelled to overrule the BIA’s denial of relief under the CAT.  
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See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition for review in part, deny it in 
part, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In 
particular, we will deny the petition with respect to Melendez’s CAT claim, but will grant 
the petition as to the withholding of removal claim and remand to the Board for further 
explanation of its particular social group determination.      
